Using a standard Hotelling model of resource exploitation, we determine the optimal energy consumption paths from three options: dirty coal, which is non-renewable and carbon-emitting; clean coal, which is also non-renewable but carbon-free thanks to carbon capture and storage (CCS); and solar energy, which is renewable and carbonfree. We assume that the atmospheric carbon stock cannot exceed an exogenously given ceiling. Taking into account learning-by-doing in CCS technology, we show the following results: i) Clean coal exploitation cannot begin before the outset of the carbon constrained phase and must stop strictly before the end of this phase; ii) The energy price path can evolve non-monotonically over time; and iii) When the solar cost is low enough, an unusual energy consumption sequence along which solar energy is interrupted for some time and replaced by clean coal may exist.
Introduction
A large body of evidence has demonstrated the potential of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in mitigating CO 2 emissions, especially from concentrated sources (e.g., the power generation sector). Given that fossil fuels supply over 85% of all primary energy needs, CCS appears as the only technology that can substantially reduce CO 2 emissions while allowing fossil fuels to meet the world's expanding energy demand (Herzog, 2011) . According to Hamilton et al. (2009) , the mitigation cost for the capture and compression of emissions from gas power plants is about $52/tCO 2 . Adding transport and storage costs ranging from $5 to $15/tCO 2 , a carbon price of about $60-65/tCO 2 is needed to make these plants competitive. However, these costs exhibit a high variance. Rubin et al. (2012) report added capital and operating costs of CCS with respect to non-CCS conventional thermic plants within a range of 60-80% for SPC plants and 30-50% for IGCC plants. 1 Considering this cost evidence, it is widely acknowledged that the actual deployment of CCS in the medium term depends heavily on the implementation of eective GHG emissions mitigation policies. IEA (2008) The uncertainty regarding the eective prospects of world climate change policies surely explains why after an enthusiastic period in the middle of the previous decade, CCS optimism has since been seriously tempered by a lack of eective development of the technology.
Carbon capture technology is still in its infancy, with approximately 20 plants in operation (Thronicker and Lange, 2015) . Given this context, the potential of learning about CCS technology has attracted a growing interest. The promoters of CCS have long advocated that, although more costly, the technology could benet from a large potential of cost reduction thanks to learning-by-doing.
Learning-by-doing postulates a progressive reduction of the production costs in the cumulative production capacity. In the engineering literature, the so-called learning rate refers to the percentage cost reduction that could result from doubling the production capacity. Van den Broek et al. (2009) reports learning rates for CCS varying between 5% and 18% for capital costs and between 0 and 30% for operating and maintenance costs 1 SPC: Super critical pulverized coal plants; IGCC: Integrated gasication combined cycle plants. 2 NGCC: natural gas combined cycle power plants.
regarding the main types of thermic plants. Such a huge variance reects the complexity of the learning assessment exercise. Cost reduction is typically achieved through more energy ecient plants, better management of other pollution mitigation devices (e.g., SO 2 emission control) and dedicated progresses for CCS operation at the plant level. Moreover, learning about energy eciency can also benet non-CCS plants. If There are four main economic drivers aecting CCS deployment. The rst driver is the implementation of environmental policies targeting carbon concentration stabilization objectives throughout the current century. The second is the world's evolving demand for energy. The third driver is the change in the supply of fossil fuels and its resulting impact on the CCS economic potential. Finally, the fourth main economic driver aecting deployment is the competition between CCS and other carbon-free options from renewable sources, such as solar, wind or biomass. Within this context, the pros and cons of CCS can be summarized as follows: on the positive side, CCS allows for the use of fossil fuel, a relatively abundant and cheap energy source, without contributing to global warming.
Furthermore, as a clean technological alternative to conventional fossil energy, it increases the social eciency of the energy production system, thus lowering the social cost of carbon. Conversely, some proposed negative aspects are that the deployment of CCS is highly dependent on the availability of safe, convenient storage facilities and the avoidance of leakage risks to local populations and natural environments. Another concern is that relatively cheap CCS can also delay the development of clean renewable alternatives and/or hinder R&D in other energy production techniques (e.g., hydrogen).
Accounting for all of these issues, the objectives of this paper are two-fold. First, we want to assess the relative strengths of these pros and cons using a stylized economic model that incorporates the previously mentioned drivers. Second, we want to describe the eects of learning-by-doing as it pertains to the optimal timing of CCS use, the dynamics of the relative competitiveness in carbon sequestration compared to other clean energy sources, and its impact on the social cost of carbon pollution under a global atmospheric carbon concentration stabilization objective.
The main drivers aecting the economic potential of CCS are highly interconnected.
In the literature, these linkages are taken into account in two ways. Many authors use integrated assessment models to evaluate the role of CCS (Mc Farland et al., 2003 , Edenhofer et al., 2005 , Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2006 , Grimaud et al., 2011 . These models underline the high sensitivity of this option concerning critical technological pitfalls and climate policy variables. However, in most cases, CCS is unlikely to become protable until the second half of the century. Other authors pursue a more analytical route by introducing CCS in theoretical models of climate change. Laorgue et al. (2008 a,b ) illustrates optimal CCS policies by using a model of energy substitution, explicitly taking into account the scarcity of sequestration sites. In a recent contribution, Grimaud and Rouge (2014) examine the CCS deployment problem using an endogenous growth model.
The issue of learning-by-doing has also attracted a great deal of attention concerning the 'induced technical change' debate. Following Goulder and Matthai (2000) , it is recognized that learning about clean technologies can have ambiguous eects on the timing of the energy transition toward a carbon-free economy. According to Manne and Richels (2004) or Gerlagh (2006) , such ambiguous features remain for CCS; learning should be expected to play a role in reducing the cost of carbon sequestration and thus the opportunity cost of carbon pollution. However, learning-by-doing inuences not only the deployment of new techniques but also the production of energy and thus the energy price dynamics. This point is examined by Chakravorty et al. (2012) with learning-by-doing in clean renewable energy technologies. They show that learning generally induces price uctuations over the course of the energy transition from polluting fossil fuels toward clean energy. Our own modeling framework is similar to this work but with a main dierence: beneting from learning-by-doing in CCS requires the burning of fossil fuels and thus forces us to confront their increasing scarcity. These two eects work in opposition of one another: the learning eect, which decreases with cumulative experience, and the scarcity eect, which increases according to the depletion of fossil resources. As the learning eect initially should override the scarcity eect and then becomes dominated by the latter, the average cost of the combined process, which consists of burning coal while abating its polluting by-product, should rst decrease and then increase. In contrast, learning about renewable energies continuously decreases their cost, as no depletion is at work here to reverse the eect of the cumulative experience, thus leading to a dierent range of possible optimal paths.
The ndings in the literature may be broadly summarized as follows. CCS needs both relatively cheap access to fossil fuels and a strong public intervention against global warming. Learning-by-doing has an ambiguous eect on the timing of CCS deployment.
Learning can induce energy price uctuations even in the so-called 'Hotelling models'.
Given this context, we pose the following questions: How do the aforementioned drivers inuence the timing of CCS implementation? How should the trigger energy price, which makes CCS competitive, be determined? Does learning-by-doing imply an early implementation of CCS? What is the impact of learning on the energy price dynamics? How does CCS, with or without learning, aect the timing and use of other clean renewable alternatives? Existing studies have addressed these questions either through static models, which neglect the properly dynamic aspects of CCS deployment, or by considering each inuencing factor individually.
To overcome such limitations, we develop the following modeling framework. Energy needs can be supplied by two primary sources: the rst source is non-renewable and carbonemitting (coal), whereas the second source is renewable and clean (solar energy). Furthermore, two energy generation modes from fossil fuels are available: the rst is a conventional technique that releases carbon emissions into the atmosphere, and the second involves using CCS to abate emissions. We assume constant marginal costs of energy delivery by conventional fossil fuel and renewable energy techniques. The CCS option incurs an additional cost, but it also benets from learning-by-doing. Following a route pioneered by Chakravorty et al. (2006) , we assume that a given carbon stabilization cap is enforced.
Hence, two clean energy options allow for the relaxation of this constraint: solar energy and CCS. The design of the optimal energy consumption path results from a comparison at any point in time between the respective marginal costs of these various options: conventional energy production, CCS or clean renewable energy. The design also depends on the energy demand and the carbon stabilization target.
In this setting, we show the following results. It is never optimal to deploy CCS before the economy is constrained by the carbon stabilization objective. When CCS is used, learning may induce non-monotonic evolutions of the energy price, which stands in contrast with the usual message coming from Hotelling models with a climate constraint and in which the economy simultaneously faces the depletion of fossil fuels and the rise of a pollution stock. When the solar cost is low enough, an unusual sequence of energy consumption can occur in which solar energy consumption is interrupted for some time and replaced by clean coal exploitation. These ndings remain valid if, instead of the complete depletion of the non-renewable resource implied by our constant marginal costs assumption, an economic depletion process wherein the amount of the resource ultimately extracted has to be endogenously determined is considered. More interestingly, our results are also robust to an explicit account of the limited carbon storage capacity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces the optimal program of the social planner and describes the rst-order conditions. Section 4 characterizes the optimal paths depending on the severity of the climate constraint and the relative cost of renewable energy. We discuss the results in Section 5. Section 6 explores the robustness of our ndings against alternative assumptions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The model
The economy produces energy services from two primary sources: a potentially carbonemitting, non-renewable resource (coal) and a clean renewable resource (solar). We denote by q the energy services production rate. Consuming q generates an instantaneous gross surplus u(q). The function u(·) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, u (q) > 0, strictly concave, u (q) < 0, and satises the rst Inada condition: lim q↓0 u (q) = +∞. We denote by p(q) the marginal gross surplus function u (q) and by q(p) its inverse (i.e., the energy demand function).
Polluting non-renewable resource Let X(t) be the available stock of coal at time t, measured in energy services equivalent units, X 0 be the initial endowment, with X(0) ≡ X 0 > 0, and x(t) be the instantaneous extraction rate, measured in the same units, so thatẊ(t) = −x(t). The unit processing cost of coal, denoted by c x , is assumed to be constant and hence equal to the marginal cost. 3 Burning and consuming coal generates carbon emissions that are proportional to its use. Let ζ be the unitary pollutant content of coal so that, lacking any abatement policy, the pollution ow released into the atmosphere amounts to ζx(t). However, the eective ow of carbon emissions might be lowered thanks to the CCS option.
Clean versus dirty coal energy production
Instead of expressing the CCS process in terms of some captured portion of the potential emission ow, we proceed formally by considering two types of techniques for producing nal energy services from coal. The rst route is a conventional technique that involves releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere we call this technique 'dirty' coal. The second option involves the capture and sequestration of carbon emissions we call this technique 'clean' coal. Thus, 'clean' and 'dirty' do not refer to dierent natural qualities of coal, which are assumed to be homogenous for our purpose here, but to dierent types of coal processing for the supply of energy services. Given x c and x d as their respective consumption rates, so that x c + x d = x, the dynamics of X is:
Let S(t) be the cumulative clean coal consumption from time 0 up to time t. Assuming that S(0) = 0 for the sake of simplicity, we have:
CCS cost and learning-by-doing
Producing energy from clean coal is more expensive than from dirty coal because an additional unit CCS cost, denoted by c s (S), must be incurred. Then, the unit cost of clean fossil energy amounts to c x + c s (S). We assume that this additional cost depends on the cumulative clean coal consumption S and that the larger the S, the larger the cumulative experience in CCS operations and the lower the c s . We thus consider a twice continuously dierentiable function c s (·), such that c s (S) < 0 and c s (S) > 0 for S ∈ (0, X 0 ), with
Note that as the objective of our study is to isolate the pure learning eect, we neglect any possible locking of the learning experience by limited reservoir capacity constraints. 4 Atmospheric pollution stock and damages Let Z(t) be the level of the atmospheric carbon concentration at time t and Z 0 be the initial concentration, so that Z(0) ≡ Z 0 ≥ 0. The pollution stock is assumed to be self-regenerating at a constant and positive proportional rate α. As only dirty coal is carbon-emitting, the dynamics of Z is given by:
Following Chakravorty et al. (2006) , we assume that so long as Z does not overshoot some critical ceilingZ, climatic damages will be almost negligible. However, for carbon concentrations larger thanZ, the damage will be immeasurably larger than the sum of the 4 Due to the scarcity of most accessible storage sites, the average CCS cost should also increase with S possibly up to some upper boundS corresponding to the global capacity of the geological carbon sinks. This type of stock eect is examined in Laorgue et al. (2008 a ). In the case of multiple carbon sinks, they state that the dierent reservoirs must be lled according to the increasing order of their respective costs. We show in Section 6 that all of the qualitative results of the paper remain valid if this scarcity eect is taken into account. discounted gross surplus generated along any path triggering this overextension. 5 Therefore, the economy must constrain the carbon stock level to remain below this cap:
An implication of this constraint is that when the ceiling is reached, the maximum quantity of dirty coal that can be consumed is given by the natural self-regeneration capacity of the environment. Ifx d denotes this quantity, then (4) implies thatx d = αZ/ζ.
Solar energy production
Solar energy is processed at a constant average cost c y . We make y n be the constant natural ow of this renewable energy and y(t) be its consumption rate at time t (in energy services units), with the usual non-negativity constraint:
When solar energy is the only energy source in use, the problem becomes static and the optimal consumption amounts toỹ such that u (ỹ) = c y . Assumeỹ ≤ y n so that y n is large enough to meet the energy demand at the marginal cost c y . This implies that no rent has ever needed to be charged for the ecient exploitation of this resource. Last, we assume that c y is larger than c x to justify the use of coal.
Relaxing the ceiling constraint can be achieved by using either clean coal or solar energy, and the relative competitiveness of these two options depends on their respective costs.
That is why we will distinguish between the cases of 'high' and 'low' solar energy costs, with what we mean by 'high' and 'low' being specied in Section 4.
Discounting and welfare
The social discount rate ρ is assumed to be positive and constant. Social welfare is dened as the discounted sum of the net surplus, provided that the cap constraint on the pollution stock is satised.
3 The social planner program
At the end user stage, when all of the costs have been covered, the energy services delivered from any source (clean coal, dirty coal or solar) are perfect substitutes, so that q = x c +x d + y. The social planner problem consists of determining the path {(x c (t), x d (t), y(t)), t ≥ 0} that maximizes social welfare: 6
subject to the state equations (1), (3) and (4), and to the inequality constraints (2), (5) and (6). Let λ S , λ X and −λ Z be the co-state variables of S, X and Z, respectively 7 , and let ν's be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality constraints on the state variables and γ's be those corresponding to the inequality constraints on the control variables. Therefore, the current valued Hamiltonian H and Lagrangian L are:
The rst-order conditions are:
combined to the usual complementary slackness conditions. The transversality condition is given by:
With a constant marginal extraction cost, the mining rent λ X grows at the social rate of discount as long as the stock of coal is not exhausted. 8 Thus, lettingt X be the time at which exhaustion occurs, we have:
we conclude that if coal has a positive initial value λ X0 > 0, then it must be exhausted along the optimal path.
We denote by t Z andt Z the time at which the ceiling constraint begins to bind and the time at which this constraint denitively ceases to be active, respectively. We therefore call the time interval [t Z ,t Z ] the 'ceiling period'. Before this period, as ν Z is nil, (12) implies: λ Z (t) = λ Z0 e (ρ+α)t , t ≤ t Z , with λ Z0 ≡ λ Z (0). After this period, λ Z must be nil:
For the problem to be meaningful, we assume that the initial coal endowment X 0 is large enough (equivalently thatZ − Z 0 is small enough) to ensure that the ceiling constraint (5) binds along the optimal path. When constrained by the carbon cap, the economy cannot produce dirty coal above the ratex d allowed by natural dilution. Because the reserves of coal are constantly declining, there must exist a nite time such that, even without any cap, the production of dirty coal falls belowx d . At this time, either coal is exhausted, in which caset Z =t X , or not. If coal is not exhausted, then the continuous depletion process implies a constant decline of coal extraction, which means that the carbon cap constraint cannot continue binding until the exhaustion of X 0 . Hence, we can conclude thatt Z ≤t X .
During an initial period [0, t Z ), the carbon stock Z increases until the carbon cap is reached.
Then, it is maintained at its mandated level during the ceiling period [t Z ,t Z ). Next, either coal is exhausted (t Z =t X ) and the economy exploits only solar energy, or a last phase
[t Z ,t X ) of coal exploitation begins, during which the remaining coal reserves constantly decline to exhaustion and the carbon constraint is no longer relevant.
Let t c andt c be the dates at which clean coal production begins and ceases, respectively.
(10) implies that λ S (t) = λ S0 e ρt for t ≤ t c , with λ S0 ≡ λ S (0). Last, we denote by t y the time at which solar energy production begins.
A common cost component of the two types of coal is c x + λ X , the processing cost augmented by the mining rent. We denote by p F (F for tax-free and abatement cost-free) this common component:
Alternatively, p F may be interpreted as the price of extracted coal before processing and thus before the possible release of carbon emissions. In addition to this common component, the full marginal cost of dirty coal, denoted by c d m , must also include the imputed social marginal cost of pollution:
On the other hand, the full marginal cost of clean coal, denoted by c c m , must include the marginal abatement cost reduced by the marginal value of learning in clean coal processing (i.e., the learning rent):
Independent of the relative competitiveness of clean coal and solar energy, the optimal paths share several common features. We describe these general properties in the next subsection. The following subsections study the implications of the relative competitiveness of the two carbon-free energy options. With respect to solar energy, clean coal production benets from a comparative advantage thanks to learning-by-doing, but it requires the actual use of coal whose scarcity increases. The balance sheet of these pro and con arguments varies over time in complex ways, leading to the rich set of possible scenarios we are going to describe.
To focus on this relative competitiveness issue, we restrict the analysis to cases where clean coal has to be exploited along the optimal path. We rst show that the production of carbon-free energy, either clean coal or solar, should not begin before the ceiling period.
Moreover, clean coal and solar energy production cannot be simultaneously conducted.
Next, we successively consider the cases of high and low solar energy costs. In both cases, the energy price may increase non-monotonically over time if the eect of learning-by-doing is strong enough. Given a high solar cost, the CCS option may be delayed until after the beginning of the ceiling period. Moreover, given a low solar cost, it may be optimal to consume solar energy during disconnected time intervals.
4.1
General properties of the optimal paths
Intertemporal tradeos induced by learning-by-doing
Learning from cumulative experience implies that the more clean coal is used, the lower its future cost will be. This suggests that λ S , which captures this positive externality, must be at least temporarily positive. However, this positive externality is present at some time t only if clean coal continues to be produced after t. Once clean coal exploitation ceases, the externality disappears.
Proposition 1 The co-state variable associated with cumulative clean coal production is positive until the end of clean coal exploitation and nil thereafter: λ S (t) > 0 for t <t c and λ S (t) = 0 for t ≥t c .
Proof: Solving the dierential equation (10) using (13) yields:
The learning rent at time t identies with the cumulative discounted sum of all future marginal cost cuts allowed by a slight accumulation of experience, which is expressed as dS = x c . Clearly, λ S is strictly positive as long as ∞ t x c dτ > 0 (i.e., as long as t <t c ) and nil thereafter.
If λ S measures the value of increased experience using the clean coal option (i.e., when t c < t <t c ), it has a slightly dierent interpretation prior to the beginning of the active clean coal production period (i.e., when t < t c ). In this case, (15) is equivalent to:
where K c stands as the total cumulative marginal value of the experience acquisition plan that spans the entire duration of the clean coal exploitation period. Prior to the beginning of this plan, λ S simply measures the discounted marginal value of experience evaluated from time t. 9 Equation (7) states the optimal learning arbitrage equation. To interpret this relation,
be the subsidy-free unit prot from clean coal exploitation. Thus, (7) implies that π c m = −λ S < 0. Beneting from learning requires negative current returns untilt c when π c m = 0, that is, as long as clean coal is exploited. Taking (15) into account, (7) is equivalent to:
On the one hand, increasing by dx c the use of clean coal at time t induces an additional loss of π c m (t)dx c . On the other hand, it allows for an additional cost reduction c (S(τ ))x c (τ )e −ρ(τ −t) dx c in present value at all later times τ > t. Following the optimal learning path, the cumulative sum of these additional cost reductions must exactly balance the initial additional loss.
The fact that the economy decides to use clean coal despite its negative returns results from the competition between clean and dirty coals. Exploiting more dirty coal has a net opportunity cost amounting to ζλ Z . To avoid paying this cost, the energy industry may prefer to bear the additional cost of clean coal energy generation c s (S). Lacking learning opportunities, (7) and (8) show that the industry is indierent between the two coal exploitation regimes when ζλ Z = c s (S). With learning possibilities, the same indierence arbitrage condition states that ζλ Z = c s (S) − λ S < c s (S). Note that if both types of coal are used, then learning, by reducing the opportunity cost of the clean coal option below its additional cost, also reduces the opportunity cost of dirty coal pollution. Equation (7) may also be interpreted as a modied Hotelling rule. Assume that the energy industry faces an exogenously given and time-decreasing additional cost c s (t). Then, the standard Hotelling rule prescribes that the clean coal exploitation rate should equal the marginal net surplus in present value at all times during actual clean coal production.
In the present model, the marginal net surplus identies with the unit net surplus, thus resulting in the following form of the Hotelling rule:
where µ 0 measures the marginal present value of the clean coal exploitation plan. However, what captures the relation (7) is not a consequence of the declining trend of the future costs of clean coal production but the possibility opened by learning of manipulating this trend to increase the value of the clean coal exploitation plan. To clarify this point, consider a clean coal exploitation plan satisfying the Hotelling rule (17) but in a learning context where c s (t) would depend on previous clean coal production decisions. Assume that the economy tries to improve industry prots above this reference plan at some time t through an increase dx c in clean coal use over a short time interval [t, t + dt). At the end of the interval, such an alteration would generate an increase of the experience level amounting to dS = dx c dt, though at the price of an accelerated depletion of fossil reserves dX = −dx c dt.
Next, during a second time interval [t+dt, t+h), the economy decides to keep its experience gain dS; that is, it reverts to the reference accumulation planṠ(t) = x c (t). As x c (t) is not modied, p(t) − c x is not modied either. However, the experience gain allows for an increase in the unit net surplus during the time interval [t + dt, t + h), which amounts to:
During the nal time interval [t + h, t + h + dt), the economy reverts to the reference path by reducing the production level of clean coal by an amount dx c , thus reducing the experience level to its reference level by the end of the interval. Note that this adjustment also restores the coal resource stock to its reference level after t + h + dt. The Hotelling rule (17) being satised, the change has no net welfare eect between the rst and the third time interval. Thus, the overall balance of the adjustment amounts to the net surplus gain from a higher experience level during the second time interval, which is clearly positive, and contradicts the optimality of the Hotelling rule (17).
At time t, the additional net surplus generated by the small increase in clean coal use, dx c (t) > 0, includes not only the variation of the current surplus,
but also the sum of the future clean cost reductions generated by this additional experience level, the value of which amounts to exploitation, we have the following modied Hotelling rule:
Comparing (17) to (18), it appears that µ 0 < λ X0 for a given energy price path {p(t), t ≥ 0}
and for any cost path {c s (t), t ≥ 0}, even for optimal ones. 10 Conversely, for a given marginal value of the clean coal exploitation plan, the energy price is lowered by an explicit account of the experience acquired from the production of clean coal energy. Beneting from the learning opportunities requires a larger use of clean coal with respect to a passive behavior, taking as given the declining trend of production costs. This does increase the scarcity of the resource, which is measured by the coal scarcity rent λ X , and induces a higher supply of clean coal, thus leading to a lower energy price.
Optimal timing of the clean options
We now describe the optimal timing of clean coal and solar energy. Proposition 2 shows that neither of these two carbon-free options should be used before the ceiling period and that the clean coal exploitation phase must be strictly closed before the end of this period.
However, as we shall see later (cf. sections 4.2 and 4.3), it may or may not be optimal to immediately begin clean coal exploitation once the ceiling has been reached.
Proposition 2 (i) Neither clean coal nor solar energy must be used before the beginning of the ceiling period: t c ≥ t Z and t y ≥ t Z . (ii) Clean coal exploitation must be closed before the end of this period:t c <t Z .
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
From Proposition 2, we conclude that if it is optimal to use clean coal, its exploitation must occur during the ceiling period:
The intuition behind this result is quite clear. If the economy is never constrained by a cap, the comparative advantage of dirty coal with respect to its clean alternatives prevents the use of clean coal or solar energy before the depletion of fossil reserves. Thus, the problem only has interest when the cap constraint eventually binds. The equations (8), (12) and (14) show that the energy price must rise before the beginning of the ceiling period. Independent of the learning process, the full marginal cost of the rst unit of clean coal is p F +c s − λ S ; thus, the clean coal option cannot be introduced before the energy price has at least reached this cost 10 To understand why rule (17) is false even if cs(t) = cs(S(t)), note that the experience accumulation condition S(t) = t 0 xcdτ , which is equivalent toṠ(t) = xc(t), must be taken into account a condition that is neglected in (17).
level. However, if that occurs before the beginning of the ceiling period, then clean coal exploitation could satisfy all of the energy demand at this price and further in time at even lower prices, thanks to learning. Thus, dirty coal production should be abandoned so that the economy would never again accumulate carbon and hence would never be constrained by the cap, which presents a contradiction.
As noted before, dirty coal use is more protable than clean coal use when the economy is no longer constrained by the carbon cap. Consequently, the clean coal option should be abandoned at most when the carbon cap is no longer binding. The fact that clean coal use should end before the end of the ceiling period results from a slightly more subtle argument. We shall see in Proposition 5 that λ Z decreases during the ceiling phase, which improves the relative competitiveness of dirty coal. As λ Z drops to zero when the ceiling period ends and as c s (S) remains above c s , dirty coal becomes more competitive than clean coal before the end of the cap period.
We turn now to the competition between clean coal and solar energy. The following proposition states that these two clean options are mutually exclusive.
Proposition 3 Clean coal and solar energy may never be simultaneously exploited.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
This result is because the full marginal cost of clean coal cannot be constant over any non-degenerate time interval. Thus, it cannot be equal to the marginal cost of solar energy, except at some particular time. In other words, the two clean options encounter the Herndahl logic of the least cost resource exploitation priority principle. 11 The nonconstancy of the full marginal cost of clean coal can be easily explained. As stated at the end of Section 3, this cost c c m is dened as the sum of two components: the common cost of coal use, p F , and the specic component of clean coal use, c s (S) − λ S . From (14) and (10) respectively, we nd thatṗ 
Dynamics of prices and quantities
Prior to the beginning of the ceiling phase, the economy produces only dirty coal. As the energy price continuously increases during the initial phase, the exploitation of dirty coal should decline. Once the capZ is reached, dirty coal use is constant and equal tox d .
At the end of the ceiling period, either coal is exhausted or not and then dirty coal use declines once again until exhaustion.
When considering the dynamics of clean coal use, it should be expected that uctuations of the clean coal marginal cost will translate into non-monotonous evolutions of its exploitation rate. To conrm this point, note that when the clean coal option is in use, its total marginal cost must be equal to the energy price: p = c c m . This implies thatṗ =ċ c m and thus thatẋ c =ċ c m /u (q). During any time phase of increasing cost (ċ c m > 0), the energy price should increase and thus the clean coal energy production rate must decrease, whereas the reverse happens during any phase of declining cost (ċ c m < 0). Hence,ẋ c may be either positive or negative. However, we can show that x c , and thus also p, can follow only two types of paths.
Note that because λ S tends toward 0 at the end of the clean coal exploitation period (cf.
Proposition 1) and is necessarily continuous in this type of deterministic model, there must exist some terminal sub-interval (t c − ∆,t c ), 0 < ∆ ≤t c − t c , during which x c decreases and the energy price p increases. Considering now the entire clean coal exploitation phase, Proposition 4 states that the sign ofẋ c may change at most only once.
Proposition 4 During a phase of simultaneous exploitation of clean and dirty coal, the energy price either increases monotonically or rst decreases and then increases. Similarly, clean coal production either decreases monotonically or rst increases and then decreases.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Equation (10) shows that the growth rate of the learning rent is lower than the discount rate (i.e., the growth rate of the coal scarcity rent). If λ X − λ S > 0 at the beginning of the clean coal exploitation phase, thenλ X /λ X >λ S /λ S implies that the rent gap increases and thus that the energy price increases while clean coal exploitation decreases all throughout the phase. Note that the operational margin p − c x − c s (S), which is the gross margin before provision for the resource depletion and the experience accumulation, is positive and permanently increasing until the end of the clean coal production period. In the opposite situation, the rent gap is initially negative and declines in absolute value until its change in sign from negative to positive. The energy price follows a parallel motion, whereas the clean coal exploitation rate follows an inverted U-shaped pattern. In this case, the operational margin is initially negative before turning to positive when approaching the end of the clean coal exploitation phase.
Dynamics of shadow values
We now describe the dynamics of the shadow values of learning and pollution during the active clean coal production phase. Proposition 5 implies that the learning rent λ S either constantly decreases or is inverted U-shaped, insofar as it rst increases before decreasing at the end of the clean coal exploitation period. Regardless of the type of path that is followed by the energy price during the ceiling period, there is only one type of path for the shadow cost λ Z of pollution during this period.
Proposition 5 (i) When clean coal production exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern and x c reaches its maximum level at time t c ∈ (t c ,t c ), then the learning rent decreases during the declining phase of x c :λ S (t) < 0, t ∈ (t c ,t c ).
(ii) The shadow marginal cost of pollution decreases during the ceiling period:λ Z (t) < 0, t ∈ (t Z ,t Z ).
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
The nal common characteristics shared by all possible optimal paths concerns their respective behaviors prior to the ceiling period. From Proposition 2, we know that this phase must occur before the beginning of the clean coal exploitation phase:
During this initial phase, the full marginal cost of the clean coal option amounts to c c m = c x +c s + (λ X0 − λ S0 )e ρt , which may either increase or decrease depending on whether the initial shadow marginal cost of coal λ X0 is larger or smaller than the initial shadow marginal value λ S0 of the cumulative experience in abatement.
Letp ≡ u (x d ). From the previous discussion, it may be concluded that the energy price cannot be higher thanp when the carbon cap constraint binds. If c y >p, then solar energy is not competitive during the ceiling phase. However, after the ceiling phase, the economy faces a conventional resource depletion problem in which solar energy stands as a backstop resource. It is well known that solar energy cannot be produced prior to coal exhaustion in such a situation. We call the 'high' solar cost case the conguration c y >p, wherein solar energy is only exploited after the complete depletion of coal. In the reverse case, a conguration we label the 'low' solar cost casep > c y , solar energy is introduced during the ceiling phase and is simultaneously used alongside coal until coal is completely depleted.
4.2
The high solar cost case: c y >p Given the characteristics of the clean coal exploitation phase, three main types of optimal scenarios can be identied. These may be revealed by building a phase portrait in the
This implicitly denes the production of clean coal during the interval, which is denoted by x d c (p), as a decreasing function of p such that x d c (p) = 0 for p =p and x d c (p) > 0 for p <p. The time dierentiation of (7) while using (10) yields: p = c x + c s (S) + (λ X − λ S ) = c x + c s (S) +ṗ/ρ. The optimal trajectory {(S(t), p(t)), t ∈ [t c ,t c )} is thus a solution of the following autonomous dierential system:
Equation (19) is only dened for p ≤p, and the locusṠ = 0 corresponds to the horizontal line p =p in the phase plane (S, p). On the other hand, the locusṗ = 0 denes the curve
It can be proved that the system (19)- (20) has a unique solution when using the particular values S(t c ) = 0 and p(t c ) ≡ p c 0 . An algorithmic argument able to identify the optimal level of p c 0 as a function of the model fundamentals is presented in the companion technical appendix.
Two cases must be considered: (i) The strong environmental constraint case,p > c x +c s .
In this case,Z is suciently low forp = u (αZ/ζ) to be higher than the upper bound over the unit exploitation cost of clean coal. (ii) The weak environmental constraint case, p < c x +c s . The phase portrait of S and p for these two cases is illustrated in Figure 1. [ Figure 1 here] The strong environmental constraint case:p > c x +c s In all scenarios, clean coal exploitation requires that p c 0 <p. This implies that clean coal exploitation must begin precisely at the time the pollution cap is reached: t c = t Z . The top panel of Figure 1 depicts the possible trajectories of S and p in this case. Two types of optimal scenarios, labeled Scenarios 1 and 2, are possible depending on whether p c 0 is larger or smaller than c x +c s . Figure 2 illustrates the optimal price and consumption paths in Scenario 1 where c x +c s < p c 0 . 12 The optimal sequence of energy use is the following: i) only dirty coal until the carbon cap is reached; ii) both dirty and clean coal during the initial part of the ceiling period; iii) only dirty coal during the remainder of the ceiling period; iv) only dirty coal during the post-ceiling phase; and v) an innite duration phase of solar energy use.
[ Figure 2 here]
Observe that during the clean coal exploitation phase, its full marginal cost constantly increases; thus, the price should also increase, whereas the use of clean coal should decrease.
Furthermore, the continuity in price at time t Z implies that the use of dirty coal jumps down when the carbon cap is attained, whereas the clean coal exploitation rate is set at a strictly positive level, which compensates for this jump. Figure 3 illustrates the optimal paths in Scenario 2 where p c 0 < c x +c s <p. As p c 0 <p, the dirty coal exploitation rate collapses at time t Z , whereas the production of clean coal jumps up by an equivalent amount, as in Scenario 1. The sequence of energy use is also the same as in Scenario 1. However, in Scenario 2, the energy price rst falls of clean coal before the depletion process takes over the learning process and reverses the trend toward a constant decline of clean coal consumption.
Adopting a weaker carbon concentration objective slightly modies the previous rationale. First, lacking learning opportunities, clean coal production is not competitive, and the economy should prefer to stick only to dirty coal production at its constrained levelx d .
Second, it is not necessarily optimal to begin producing clean coal as soon as the carbon cap is attained, even considering available learning possibilities. We examine this case now.
The weak environmental constraint case:p < c x +c s
The phase portrait for this case is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 1 . If p c 0 <p, then the optimal clean coal exploitation path corresponds to Scenario 2. If p c 0 =p, then it is characterized by Scenario 3. In this last situation, Figure 4 shows that the optimal sequence of phases is modied as follows. Clean coal production begins to be competitive only after the outset of the ceiling period. The phase of joint exploitation of both types of coal still occurs during the ceiling period, but it is now anked by two phases of exclusively dirty coal use: t Z < t c <t c <t Z . Once again, this sequence results from the uctuating behavior of the full marginal cost of clean coal, as illustrated in Figure 4 . Contrary to the previous cases (c.f. Figure 2) , the exploitation of clean coal now begins smoothly, lim t↓t c x c (t) = 0, and there is no longer an abrupt drop in dirty coal use at time t c .
[ Figure 4 here]
Conclusion for the high solar cost case
In this case, solar energy is never competitive before the exhaustion of coal. The optimal timing and use scale of the clean coal option thus only depends on its relative competitiveness with respect to dirty coal. Proposition 2 states that clean coal is never competitive until the economy is constrained by the cap, irrespective of the importance of future learning opportunities. For clean coal to be competitive, its opportunity cost c c m must be lower than the upper boundp. Lacking learning, c c m = p F +c s constantly increases, implying that if clean coal is not competitive at the beginning of the ceiling phase, then it will never be competitive. With learning possibilities, CCS is introduced at the onset of the ceiling phase if c c m (t Z ) <p, as in the no-learning case. However, the potential learning rate may be so high that, although CCS is not competitive when the carbon cap begins to bind (i.e., if c c m (t Z ) >p), it may become competitive, at least temporarily, during the ceiling period. As we discuss now, a low solar cost level implies that clean coal will have to compete not only with dirty coal but also with solar energy, which results in other optimal scenarios of energy consumption.
4.3
The low solar cost scenarios: c y <p As c y <p, then, during the ceiling period, dirty coal is necessarily used alongside either solar energy or clean coal. The phase portrait of the dynamics of p and S in this case (not depicted) is very similar to the one for the high solar cost case, withp simply being replaced by c y . Thus, the discussion may be organized by distinguishing the moderately cheap solar cost case, when c y > c x +c s , from the very cheap solar case, when c y < c x +c s .
The optimal paths correspond to either Scenario 1 or 2 in the rst case and to either Scenario 2 or 3 in the second case.
Moderately cheap solar energy: c y > c x +c s As p c 0 < c y is a necessary condition for the use of clean coal in this cost conguration, the phase of joint exploitation of the two types of coal must begin when the ceiling is attained and before the introduction of the solar option. Two possibilities must be considered next.
First, if c x +c s < p c 0 < c y , then the optimal path corresponds to Scenario 1. The energy price increases all throughout the clean coal exploitation phase. As in the high solar cost case, dirty coal production drops at the beginning of the clean coal production phase a fall that is compensated for by a parallel upward jump in the production of clean coal. This phase ends when the energy price is equal to c y and solar energy becomes competitive. Then, according to Proposition 4, the clean coal option is denitively replaced by the solar option: p(t c ) = c y andt c = t y . The production of solar energy substitutes for the production of clean coal while remaining at the ceiling level up to the time at which p F = c y . Finally, dirty coal exploitation is closed when reserves are exhausted, and thereafter solar energy supplies all energy needs. Note that in this case, the end of the ceiling period coincides with the time at which coal is exhausted:t Z =t X .
Second, if p c 0 < c x +c s < c y , then the optimal path follows Scenario 2. Clean coal production begins at a strictly positive level when the carbon cap is reached, implying a drop in the dirty coal production rate, as in the preceding Scenario 1. However, now clean coal production rises during the initial time phase before declining to zero. The energy price rst declines and then rises up to the cost level of solar energy. When this level is attained, clean coal exploitation is shut down and replaced by solar energy exploitation in conjunction with dirty coal exploitation. Thus,t c = t y as in Scenario 1, and the exploitation of dirty coal at the ceiling continues until the depletion of the coal reserves (t Z =t X ). The economy moves last to a pure solar energy exploitation regime. As they are very similar to those in the high solar cost case, the associated price and consumption paths of Scenarios 1 and 2 for the moderately cheap solar cost case are not depicted here.
With a moderately low cost, solar energy becomes competitive with respect to dirty coal during the ceiling period, though not with respect to clean coal, at least at the beginning. However, the same rationale as in the high solar cost case applies here. Lacking learning opportunities, the coal depletion process will progressively reduce the comparative advantage of clean coal until it is replaced by solar energy. The same holds with learningby-doing, the only dierence being the possibility of an initial time phase at the ceiling that is characterized by an expanding use of clean coal before resource scarcity is able to overrun the declining clean coal cost trend induced by learning. If solar energy is very cheap, then learning becomes necessary for the clean coal option to remain competitive. However, it also becomes possible that solar energy has an initial comparative advantage with respect to clean coal at the beginning of the ceiling phase, thus delaying the use of clean coal.
Very cheap solar energy: c y < c x +c s If p c 0 < c y , then the economy follows the optimal path corresponding to Scenario 2. However, solar energy may be cheap enough to become competitive with respect to dirty coal prior to the production of clean coal. Figure 5 illustrates this situation. In such a scenario, solar energy is introduced at the beginning of the ceiling period, t y = t Z , and clean coal exploitation starts only afterward, so that t y < t c <t c <t Z . During the time interval [t c ,t c ] of joint exploitation of both types of coal, the exploitation of solar energy is interrupted because the energy price is lower than the trigger price c y . At t =t c , solar energy restores its competitiveness with respect to clean coal and replaces it in the energy mix.
Subsequently, dirty coal and solar energy are simultaneously used again until time t =t Z when p F (t) = c y and the coal stock is exhausted. Observe that clean coal use does not start smoothly at t c , as in the high solar cost case. Because solar energy is used before t c and also aftert c , clean coal use is abruptly initiated at the level of solar energy production at the beginning of the clean coal exploitation phase and is reduced from this level to zero by the end of the phase.
[ Figure 5 here]
Conclusion for the low solar cost case
The energy price can never be higher than c y , the marginal cost of solar energy. If the marginal cost of clean coal is lower than c y at the time the ceiling is reached, then the CCS option dominates the solar option, at least initially. As learning is unable to eternally counteract the continuous rise of the full marginal cost of clean coal, its exploitation ends once this cost becomes higher than c y . In this scenario, learning ability only opens a brief window for clean coal generation before the introduction of solar energy during the ceiling phase. If the marginal cost of clean coal is higher than c y at the time the ceiling is reached, then clean coal is irrelevant with respect to the cheaper solar alternative. However, the continuous decline in the opportunity cost of the clean coal option allows for its eventual use at the expense of the solar option. In such scenarios, solar energy is initially used at the beginning of the ceiling phase in combination with dirty coal while waiting for the clean coal option to become competitive. It appears once again when the competitive advantage of clean coal has been suciently reduced due to the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels.
Discussion
Our work reveals the potential complexity of the phasing of clean alternatives to polluting fossil fuels, even within a highly stylized framework. The usual time ordering through the least cost, rst used principle may be blurred due to learning-by-doing eects. Models in the Hotelling vein usually predict a steady rise of the energy price and an ever-contracting energy supply. Learning abilities may aect the validity of these conclusions, insofar as the supply of clean energy may possibly increase, at least temporarily, which would lead to a decrease in the energy price.
To discuss more in depth the implications of learning-by-doing on CCS use, it is convenient to briey describe the CCS deployment problem without learning eects. Assume a constant CCS unit costc s . For clean coal to be competitive, the operational cost c x +c s must be lower than eitherp, in the high solar cost case, or c y , in the low solar cost case. If this competitiveness condition is satised, then clean coal is introduced when the carbon cap is reached, and its production stops before the end of the ceiling phase. The energy price constantly increases during the clean coal exploitation phase, whereas the clean coal production rate declines.
In the companion technical appendix, we draw a sensitivity analysis in the absence of learning opportunities. We show that: (i) A lower coal scarcity (i.e., a higher coal initial endowment X 0 ) decreases the resource rent, increases the shadow cost of carbon, drops the energy price path and thus the trigger price at which CCS becomes competitive, and favors an earlier start of CCS use at a higher rate and for a longer time period; (ii) A worse initial state of the environment (i.e., a lowerZ − Z 0 ) has the same qualitative eect as a lower resource scarcity level, except that it triggers an initial increase of the energy price path; and (iii) A more expensive CCS technology (i.e., a higherc s ) decreases the resource rent, increases the shadow cost of carbon, initially increases the energy price path, and delays the introduction of CCS, implying that clean coal is produced at a lower rate over a shorter time period.
These ndings are in line with the literature using numerical assessment models. Lacking learning opportunities, two factors favor the deployment of CCS: cheap access to fossil fuels and a stringent atmospheric carbon concentration target. However, note that an early introduction of CCS may be indierently triggered under a low energy price regime, as in the case of an abundant non-renewable resource, or under a high energy price regime, resulting, for example, from a high shadow cost of carbon pollution. These opposite outcomes suggest the existence of a critical decreasing relationship between coal scarcity and the severity of the carbon cap, which results in the same level of the competitiveness trigger price justifying the use of the CCS option. They also imply that CCS is relevant only for suciently high initial endowments pairs (X 0 , Z 0 ).
Another important remark concerns the inuence of CCS on the timing of renewable energy use. Without CCS, a larger coal endowment or a worse initial state of the environment delays the transition toward solar energy in the high solar cost case and advances it in the low solar cost case. With CCS but without learning eects, the introduction of solar energy is always delayed. In the high solar cost conguration, this result is simply due to the slowdown in the extraction pace, which is induced by a more severe carbon pollution problem, and CCS plays no role in this. In the low solar cost case, a larger availability of coal and/or a more stringent carbon cap improves the competitiveness of CCS at the expense of solar energy and then delays the exploitation of the later.
The consequences of a higher CCS cost oer a good illustration of the inuence of CCS technology characteristics on energy use and the price dynamics. The loss of CCS competitiveness resulting from a higher cost is distributed across both the crude energy input price, p F , by lowering it, and the end-use energy price, p, by increasing it. It is worth noting that this impact materializes not only during the clean coal exploitation phase, as should be intuitively expected, but also before this phase (i.e., prior to the ceiling period).
In terms of timing, CCS introduction is delayed and the clean coal exploitation period is shortened. In the low solar cost case, solar energy use also starts earlier. The rst feature results from the lesser competitiveness of clean coal with respect to dirty coal, and the second results from its lesser competitiveness with respect to solar energy.
Describing the eects of larger initial coal endowments in the case of learning possibilities is a more intricate task. In Scenario 3, wherein clean coal is used after the beginning of the ceiling period, we show the following results (cf. companion technical appendix).
A larger coal initial endowment, or an equivalently worse initial state of the environment, binds the ceiling constraint earlier. Larger coal reserves induce a pivotal eect on the energy price, initially decreasing the price path and only increasing it when the atmospheric carbon stock nears the cap. In contrast, a worse initial state of the environment increases the entire energy price trajectory. However, these eects are not specic to the present model and would appear even without the CCS option.
More interestingly, a larger coal stock or a worse initial state of the environment induces a forward shift of the entire clean coal exploitation phase. Not only does a more severe carbon problem have no reason to favor an early beginning of CCS in such scenarios, but it should also be a motive for delaying its introduction. The reason for this counter-intuitive behavior is the stopping condition in the learning process. Throughout the learning plan, the marginal gain of learning decreases, whereas the opportunity cost of burning more coal to learn more about CCS technology increases. Thus, the learning process is submitted to a stopping rule according to which learning has to be resumed when the marginal gain from an increased experience is matched by the marginal opportunity cost of the coal use it implies. However, this stopping rule only depends upon the characteristics of the learning curve and the value of the remaining coal reserves for future use after the end of the clean coal exploitation phase. Thus, a higher initial coal stock simply delays the time at which the stopping rule applies. As the length of the clean coal phase is xed in Scenario 3, the result will be a translation farther in time of the same clean coal exploitation plan and thus of the same learning plan. In this scenario, the marginal value of learning in present value at time 0 is thus reduced by the larger coal reserves or the worse initial state of the environment.
Finally, let us turn to the policy implications of a CCS deployment with learning-bydoing abilities. The implementation of the optimal policy requires both a pollution tax on residual carbon emissions and a clean coal subsidy. The time prole of the pollution tax rate ζλ Z has the well-known, inverted-U prole obtained in most global warming studies, in accordance with the research pioneered by Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Tahvonen (1997) .
This time prole is also the standard prole of the models with ceiling constraints that were pioneered by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and the time prole of the mixed model of Amigues et al. (2011) , in which both small and catastrophic instances of damage are taken into account. In a deterministic context, the unitary clean coal subsidy is abruptly set to the optimal level λ S when clean coal exploitation begins. Subsequently, this subsidy may follow two possible evolutions. Either it constantly decreases until the end of the clean coal exploitation phase (Scenario 1), or it rst increases before decreasing when the economy comes close to exhausting its protable learning opportunities (Scenarios 2 and 3).
Extensions
The present analysis can be extended in several directions. Here, we focus on two of them. First, we introduce stock eects in coal extraction costs. Second, we describe the consequences of a limited carbon storage capacity.
One may wonder if coal exploitation may ultimately end not because of a physical shortage of fuels but due to more economic reasons. To accommodate this idea, assume that the unit extraction cost c x is not constant but rather is a decreasing function of the remaining reserves. 13 Let c x (X) be this function, assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable and such that c x (X) < 0, c x (X) > 0, c x (X 0 ) = c x > 0 and c x (0 + ) = +∞.
The last assumption insures that the total coal endowment X 0 will never be entirely mined, so that some fraction of the coal reserves forever remain underground.
In this new framework, the dynamics of the mining rent is given byλ X = ρλ X +c x (X)x.
The dynamics of p F = c x (X)+λ X is thus dened asṗ F = −c (X)x+λ X = ρλ X > 0. Then, this common cost component increases over time, as in the original model (cf. equation (14)). To compute the nal grade of the mined coal, denoted byX, remark rst that at the optimal coal mining closure timet X , λ X (t X ) = 0. In the high solar cost case, c y >p implies that the economy is no longer constrained by the carbon cap att X . Therefore, price continuity requires that c y = p F (t X ) = c x (X(t X )), which determines in a unique waỹ X = X(t X ). The same applies to the low solar cost case, in which the price remains equal to c y until the end of coal exploitation. Note that the nal gradeX depends only on the cost characteristics of coal extraction and solar energy production.
As p F is still increasing through time and as the total amount of extracted coal is determined only by the features of the last pure solar use phase, the results of Propositions 1-5 remain valid under an economic depletion process induced by increasing extraction costs. The entire set of scenarios identied in Section 4 also remains valid. Finally, note that we could also consider in the same way an increasing cost function c x (X) to reect a dominating learning eect in coal extraction activities. As with a decreasing function, because the dynamics of p F is not modied, our previous ndings still hold. 13 The underlying assumption is that coal deposits have dierent extraction costs and are exploited by increasing order of their respective costs (cf. Herndahl, 1967) . Now assume that CCS is constrained by a limited storage capacityW . Let W (t) be the cumulative carbon stock stored in available deposits at time t:Ẇ (t) = ζx c (t) until the available storage sites have been lled, which formally occurs when the capacity constraint W − W (t) ≥ 0 binds. Denoting by λ W the scarcity rent of storage sites, we have λ W > 0 if the capacity constraint eventually binds. Thus, the rst-order condition (7), with respect to clean coal production, is modied as follows:
Conditions (8)- (12) are unchanged, whereas the transversality condition (13) becomes:
Let ν W denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the storage capacity constraint.
The motion of λ W obeys:λ
Lett W be the time at which the capacity constraint binds. Then, clean coal exploitation must stop at this time:t c =t W . Since ν W (t) = 0 for t ≤t c , we conclude from (24) that λ W (t) = λ W 0 e ρt for t ≤t c , with λ W 0 ≡ λ W (0). During the active clean coal exploitation phase, (7') is then equivalent to:
Using the CCS option now requires two non-renewable resources that are strict complements: coal and sequestration capacity. The full marginal opportunity cost of clean coal exploitation as given by the R.H.S. of (25) is still the sum of two components. The rst component c x +λ X +ζλ W permanently increases over time, whereas the second component c s (S) − λ S decreases, as in the original model.
The only point to check is that CCS is not deployed prior to the ceiling period. However, with limited sequestration capacities, the argument presented in Proposition 2 is even stronger. To see this point, assume that the economy decides to sequester some polluting emissions z at time t < t Z . The other option would be to not sequester z at time t, release it into the atmosphere, and counterbalance what remains of z in the atmosphere by an increase of the carbon capture at time t Z . What remains of z at time t Z thus amounts to z −α(t Z −t) < z thanks to natural dilution. Hence, the sequestration eort is lower, thus allowing savings on the sequestration capacity input. This shows that the qualitative properties of the optimal paths as described in the original model are preserved. Of course, limited storage capacities lower the competitiveness of CCS with respect to either dirty coal or solar energy production. However, provided that clean coal is actually exploited despite its lower protability, the entire set of optimal scenarios of the original model remains valid in this context.
Conclusion
Carbon capture and storage appears as a promising method for reconciling an extended use of fossil fuels while mitigating carbon emissions. However, this option faces various pitfalls. First, CCS requires suitable sites able to store carbon dioxide with low leakage risks. Second, CO 2 recovery and compression from thermic energy production plants incurs signicant additional costs either for new installations or for existing ones. In view of these constraints, the lack of a present strong policy action against climate change surely explains why the CCS technology remains in its infancy, having only a few plants in operation throughout the world. Nevertheless, promoters of CCS have long claimed that while incurring signicant additional costs today, the technology could provide a potentially large amount of cost reduction due to learning-by-doing.
We have studied these issues through a stylized dynamic model. The deployment of CCS under learning possibilities should aect not only the timing of carbon accumulation or the phasing of other carbon-free energy generation techniques but also the trend of energy prices. We have shown that with sucient learning abilities, CCS use may induce a non-monotonous evolution of the energy price. This opens the possibility of both very complex timing scenarios for the exploitation of CCS and the transition from fossil fuels toward renewable energy sources. We rst described these possible scenarios in a simplied context, not taking into account the scarcity of storage sites or the economic conditions determining the nal depletion of fossil fuels. We next showed that our results still hold when these features are explicitly considered.
Our work can be extended in several directions. In the context of the induced technical change debate, CCS deployment requires specic subsidies to eciently monitor the learning-by-doing process of this technology. The same applies to other carbon-free technical options, such as solar energy or biomass production, suggesting that directed technical change monitoring dierent potential climate change mitigation options should be worth specic study. Such a framework appears also interesting for examining the issue of technological spillovers between CCS and eciency enhancing energy generation techniques, a point frequently emphasized in the engineering literature. Our modeling setting also neglects the proper investment constraints on CCS development. Our ndings suggest that CCS should be used as a sort of interim option allowing for the temporary reduction of the mitigation constraint on carbon emissions while waiting for other carbon-free energy sources to become predominant in the energy mix.
Finally, the implementation of ecient learning trajectories typically requires a combination of policy instruments which evolve over time in possibly complex views. This is particularly striking in the case of CCS. The claimt c <t Z Assume that at time t ≥t Z , both types of coal are used. Equating their full marginal costs and taking into account that λ Z = 0 for all t ≥t Z , we get: p F (t) = p F (t)+c s (S(t))−λ S (t).
Using (A.1) and simplifying, it comes: c s (S(t c ))e −ρtc = −ρ t c t c s (S(τ ))e −ρτ dτ < 0, which is a contradiction.
A.2
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that clean coal and solar energy are simultaneously used during some time interval.
Then, their full marginal costs must be equal: c y = c x +λ X0 e ρt +c s (S(t))−λ S (t). Replacing Assume thatẋ c (t) = 0 at some time t ∈ [t c ,t c ) and dene t 0 as the rst time at which the equality holds over the interval [t c ,t c ). Dierentiating (7) with respect to time and using (10) results in: u (x c (t) +x d )ẋ c (t) = ρ[λ X0 e ρt − λ S (t)]. Dene φ(t) ≡ λ X0 e ρt − λ S (t). The concavity of u(·) implies that:
x c (t) > / = / < 0 ⇔ φ(t) < / = / > 0 .
Time dierentiating φ and using (10) again implies:φ(t) = ρφ(t) − c s (S)x c (t). Integrating over [t 0 , t], with t 0 < t ≤t c , and taking into account that φ(t 0 ) = 0, we obtain: φ(t) = −e ρt t t 0 c s (S(τ ))x c (τ )e −ρτ dτ > 0, ∀t ∈ (t 0 ,t c ] .
We conclude thatẋ c (t) < 0 for t ∈ (t 0 ,t c ]. Hence, if the sign ofẋ c changes, then this change occurs only once and from positive to negative.
A.4
Proof of Proposition 5
The claimλ S (t) < 0, t ∈ (t c ,t c )
Consider any pair of successive dates t i and t i+1 such that t c ≤ t i < t i+1 <t c , at whichλ S alternates in sign and between which the sign ofλ S does not change. We show that λ S (t i ) is a local maximum while λ S (t i+1 ) is a local minimum. As lim t↑tc λ S (t) = 0, there must exist a third date t i+2 at which the sign ofλ S alternates again and reaches a local maximum, which contradicts the above statement from which λ S (t i+1 ) should be a maximum and λ S (t i+2 ) should be a minimum.
To show this statement, note that from (10), asλ S (t h ) = 0, h = i, i + 1, then ρλ S (t h ) = −c s (S(t h ))x c (t h ). As S(t i+1 ) > S(t i ) and c s > 0, then −c s (S(t i )) > −c s (S(t i+1 )), whereas sinceẋ c (t) < 0 for t ∈ (t i , t i+1 ), then x c (t i ) > x c (t i+1 ). This implies that λ S (t i ) > λ S (t i+1 ).
Then, λ S (t i ) is a local maximum whereas λ S (t i+1 ) is a local minimum.
Let t j and t j+1 , t j < t j+1 <t c , be the two last successive dates at which λ S reaches a maximum and drops to a minimum beforet c , respectively. As lim t↑tc λ S (t) = 0, there must exist a third date t j+2 ∈ (t j+1 ,t c ) at which λ S attains a local maximum, so that λ S (t j+1 ) < λ S (t j+2 ), which is in contradiction with the above result.
The claimλ Z (t) < 0, t ∈ (t Z ,t Z )
Let us review the various possibilities that can occur during the ceiling period.
(i) Both types of coal are exploited. As clean coal is exploited, then p = p F + c s (S) − λ S .
Dierentiating with respect to time and using (10) implies: p(t) =ṗ F (t) + c s (S(t))x c (t) −λ S (t) =ṗ F (t) − ρλ S (t) . (A.3)
As dirty coal is simultaneously exploited, then we must also have p = p F + ζλ Z .
Time dierentiating and taking (A.3) into account, we get:
(ii) Both dirty coal and solar energy are exploited. Equating their full marginal costs implies: p = c y = p F + ζλ Z . Time dierentiating and using (14), we get: 0 =ṗ F (t) + ζλ Z (t) = ρλ X0 e ρt + ζλ Z (t) ⇔λ Z (t) = − ρ ζ λ X0 e ρt < 0 .
(iii) Only dirty coal is exploited. In this case, we must have:
Hence, from (14),λ Z (t) = − 1 ζṗ F (t) = − ρ ζ λ X0 e ρt < 0. Finally, note that althougḣ λ Z is not necessarily continuous, λ Z is always continuous. 
